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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Under the George W. Bush administration, the United States actively pursued two 
seemingly confluent foreign policy objectives: to promote democracy worldwide and to 
deter terrorism, not just in the United States, but worldwide. While these two objectives 
seemed to go hand in hand theoretically (“If they can vote, they won’t need to bomb 
anything to coerce public officials.”), they did not work so neatly together in practice.  
Other studies have investigated the interactions of terrorism, democracy, and the 
economy, yet few have looked at these three in as much detail as they ought to have. 
Democracy is neither well-defined nor easily encapsulated as a binary variable. For this 
reason, I use the POLITY IV data set to split government regimes in to three different 
types of regimes, autocracies, anocracies, and democracies in order to challenge old 
assumptions and to perhaps create new assumptions – assumptions which may prove to 
be useful in determining public policy.  
 
DEFINING DEMOCRACY 
In his 1991 book entitled The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century, the late American historian Samuel Huntington argued that in 1974 the number 
of democracies began to surge for the third time in history.1 However, it was not until 
1991 that the first African leader peacefully stepped down after losing an election. Since 
                                                 
1
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 3. 
 5 
this groundbreaking election in Benin, at least nine other African leaders have similarly 
stepped down.2 
One of the shortcomings of Huntington’s hypothesis is that, while few would 
argue that African countries have not made significant gains in political freedoms and 
civil liberties over the past few decades, it remains difficult to call them true democracies. 
Rather, they rest somewhere in the middle of the spectrum between consolidated 
democracies and full autocracies.  
There are many different approaches to defining what makes a true democracy. 
The minimalists say that it only requires elections, whereas more elaborate definitions 
include the necessity of various civil liberties. One of the most prominent definitions of a 
true electoral democracy comes from the trusted, Washington-based think tank known as 
Freedom House. According to their definition, an electoral democracy includes: 
1. A competitive, multiparty political system. 
2. Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states 
may legitimately place on citizens such as sanctions for criminal offenses). 
3. Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, 
reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud that yield 
results that are unrepresentative of the public will. 
4. Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the 
media and through generally open political campaigning.3 
 
While the absence of one of these criteria means that a nation cannot be considered an 
electoral democracy, Freedom House may deem that the country is still ‘Partly Free.’ 
Such a designation shows that even influential think tanks believe that democracies 
cannot easily be defined as a dichotomous ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
                                                 
2
 “A Good Example.” The Economist. October 22, 2009. 
<http://www.economist.com/node/14699869?story_id=14699869> 
3
 Freedom House, “Methodology.” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005 
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 Other democracy indices go yet even further than Freedom House. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Index of Democracy4 includes the functioning of government, 
meaning that ‘if democratically based decisions cannot or are not implemented then the 
concept of democracy is not very meaningful or it becomes an empty shell.” The EIU 
also includes the political culture in its calculations. A nation with a high political culture 
score would have a fervently active citizenry that would regularly be divided into winners 
and losers, yet the losers would allow for the peaceful transition of power. Another index, 
Vanhanen’s ‘Polyarchy Index,’ pays particular attention to participation.5 A democracy in 
which a significant portion of the population does not participate can hardly be expected 
to represent the will of the people. For this paper, I have opted to use the Polity IV data 
set, which is similar to that of the EIU. I will go into further detail about this set later 
under the data section. 
 Having discussed what an ideal democracy would look like, it is important to look 
at the alternatives. At the far opposite end of the spectrum, there are countries like North 
Korea, which is about as autocratic as possible. Fully authoritarian regimes harshly crack 
down on any dissent, do not have multi-party elections, and generally do not respect 
universal human rights. 
Clearly presenting democracy as a binary variable creates a false dichotomy. If a 
country is not a full democracy, one cannot assume that it is a full autocracy. Take the 
                                                 
4
 Laza Kekic. “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy.” The Economist 
Intelligence Unit. 2007. pp 1-2 
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf 
5
 Tatu Vanhanen, “Introduction: Measures of Democratization,” Center for the Study of 
Civil Wars, March 2000, 6-9 
http://www.prio.no/misc/Download.aspx?file=%2fprojects%2fdataset-website-
workspace%2fPolyarchy%2520Dataset%2520Manuscript%2ffile42501_introduction.pdf 
 7 
nation of Turkey as an example. According to Freedom House, they were partly free in 
2010.6 Their level of freedom and democracy simply were not up to the same levels as, 
nations like the United States, yet it was clearly above others such as Saudi Arabia. These 
in-between nations are called by many different names, including flawed democracies, 
hybrid regimes, and even anocracies, but for the remainder of this paper, they will be 
referred to as anocracies, as that is what the Polity IV scale calls them. 
While defining democracy is difficult enough, actually trying to quantify the 
strength of a democracy becomes an added challenge. Munck and Verkuilen (2002) claim 
there are three challenges surrounding this process: conceptualization, measurement, and 
aggregation.7 
 In order to conceptualize an index of democracy, one must first settle upon its 
definition. The ‘thicker’ the definition is, the more variables one must include, which 
runs the risk of adding ‘theoretically irrelevant attributes.’8 Similarly, if I take too 
minimalist of a definition, I run the risk of leaving out potentially important attributes. 
While I am not about to say there is a single, perfect definition I must strive for, these are 
problems that must be carefully thought out before the analyzing can even begin. 
 Having decided upon a certain definition and its attributes, I must determine how 
to measure them. For example, if the attribute is that elections are regularly contested, 
one might choose the number of years between elections as an indicator. These indicators 
                                                 
6
 Freedom House, “Map of Freedom in the World 2010,” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010 
7
 Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: 
Evaluating Alternative Indices,” Comparative Political Studies,  February 2002,  vol. 35  
no. 1. 4-6, http://cps.sagepub.com/content/35/1/5.short?rss=1&ssource=mfc 
8
 Ibid., pp 4-6. 
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ought to be reasonably homogenous, require minimal distinctions and should be able to 
be cross-checked through multiple sources. 
 
TERRORISM 
 In this section I will look at prior academic findings to define terrorism, to explain 
how often it occurs, and to discuss how it affects the economy while controlling for 
different regime types (autocracy, anocracy, and democracy).  
 While one man’s terrorist may be another’s freedom fighter, I must still come to an 
apolitical definition of terrorism to continue. According to Enders and Sandler (2005), 
terrorism is defined as:  
‘the premeditated use or threat of use of extranormal 
violence or brutality by subnational groups or individuals to 
obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear 
directed at a large audience.’9 
 
This is in line with most other definitions, including the United States’ legal definition of 
terrorism, which is that it involves ‘acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State’ and is intended to intimidate a 
civilian population and influence government policy. 10 
 In effect, terrorism is little more than deadly theater. Terrorists use mass media to 
stir up a frenzy among the populace and divert attention to their goals, which can be 
                                                 
9
 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “Transnational Terrorism 1968-2000: Thresholds, 
Persistence, and Forecasts,” Sourthern Economic Journal. Vol. 71, No. 3. 2003 pp467-
482. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20062054 
10
 Legal Information Institute. “United States Code: Title 18,2331.” Cornell Law, June 
29, 2010 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002331----000-.html 
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political, social, religious, nationalist, or ethnic, etc. Their terror is greatly amplified by 
their seemingly random time and locations.  
Abadie and Gardeazabal quoted a Congressional Joint Economic Committee 
which found that terrorism has four main economic effects: 
1. Capital stock (human and physical) of a country is reduced as a result of 
terrorist attacks 
2. The terrorist threat induces higher levels of uncertainty. 
3. Terrorism promotes increases in counter-terrorism expenditures, drawing 
resources from productive sectors for use in security. 
4. Terrorism is known to affect negatively specific industries such as 
tourism11 
 
The majority of these channels are not the direct results of the destruction wrought upon 
the country, but rather are the results of our reactions. With the possible exception of 
outlier attacks such as the collapse of the World Trade Centers on September 11th, 2001, 
terrorist attacks themselves have proportionally much smaller effect than the public’s 
reaction to them. 
 In addition to these four effects, the Milken Institute published the “Economic 
Impacts of Global Terrorism: From Munich to Bali” which further describes the different 
economic effects of terrorism. One of their discoveries is that terrorist attacks act as a 
‘frictional cost and, unlike increased taxes or tariffs, does not provide public revenue.’ 
Indeed, doubling the number of terrorist attacks reduces bilateral trade by approximately 
4 percent12.  
                                                 
11
 Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal. “Terrorism and the World Economy.” 
University of the Basque Country,” August 2007, 2. http://www.dfaeii.ehu.es/s0044-
con/en/contenidos/informacion/00044_documentos/en_00044_dc/adjuntos/wp2005-
19.pdf 
12
 James R. Barth, Tong Li, Don McCarthy, Triphon Phumiwasana, and Glenn Yago. 
“Economic Impacts of Global Terrorism: From Munich to Bali.” Milken Institute. 
 10 
Many studies have empirically shown that terrorist attacks, especially deadly 
ones, occur more frequently in democratic countries than in autocratic countries. For 
example, in “The Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism,” Blomberg, Hess and 
Orphanides showed that the incidence of terrorism was almost twice as likely in a rich 
democracy (0.425) than in a non-democracy (.233). However, when terrorism is viewed 
on a per capita basis, the ‘relationship between governance, income, and terrorism is 
somewhat smaller.’13 Such findings may come as a surprise to some who believe that 
democracy allows citizens to peacefully and regularly change the path their country is 
taking, therefore eliminating the need for political violence. 
 There are likely to be many causes why democracies face so many more terrorist 
attacks. One potential explanation concerns the information liberalization and the 
globalization that occurs when a country democratizes. Citizens have access to much 
more information, including seditious or hateful works which have the potential to incite 
political violence. They also have easy access to the information necessary to pulling off 
an attack. 
 Another reason democracies are more susceptible to attacks is inherent to the 
government’s structure. Stephen Nemeth explains this as the ‘loyalty index,’ the ratio of 
                                                                                                                                                 
October 2006. pp 13-16 
<http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/econ_impact_terrorism.pdf>  (accessed April 4, 
2011)  
13
 Brock Blomberg, Gregory Hess, Athanasios Orphanides, “The Macroeconomic 
Consequences of Terrorism.” Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 51 Issue 5 2004. pp 
10- 12 http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v51y2004i5p1007-1032.html 
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the “winning coalition” to the “selectorate.”14  The selectorate is the subset of the 
population that can influence public policy, which in a democracy is the electorate and in 
an autocracy it could be a few elites or party members. The winning coalition is a subset 
of this selectorate which is loyal to the leader in charge, which could simply be members 
of the majority party in a democracy. 
 Since the winning coalition can be highly variable in a democracy, and since the 
selectorate is virtually everyone, terrorists have an incentive to launch devastating public 
attacks. The fear is spread among the masses, forcing the leaders to take action. 
Furthermore, in a democracy with independent media, it is likely that the fright which the 
attacks impose is even greater. 
By approaching the logic behind terrorist attacks, it becomes easier to understand 
why certain types of governments suffer different types of terrorism. In highly autocratic 
regimes, one is most likely to see assassinations, kidnappings, and acts of sabotage, 
whereas democracies are most likely to witness public attacks. In fact, for the past two 
decades, democracies have been the exclusive victim of suicide attacks.15 Nemeth 
showed that, regardless of region, countries “scoring low on the Polity IV democracy 
score provided the highest level of attacks on political leaders and the lowest on the 
                                                 
14
 Stephen Nemeth. “Adaptive Tactics: Terrorist Targeting and Regime Type” University 
of Iowa. 2006. pp 9-14 
http://myweb.uiowa.edu/snemeth/MPSA%20Terrorism%20Paper.pdf 
15
 Robert A. Pape “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” American Political 
Science Review Vol. 97, No3. August 2003, pp 2-4. 
<http://www.danieldrezner.com/research/guest/Pape1.pdf> 
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public.”16 The public may not clamor to change policy after a kidnapping as much as they 
would if they felt their own lives were at stake.  
Terrorists also consider democracies to be weaker than authoritarian regimes.17 
The government is subject to the will of the people, and therefore politicians must show 
their supporters that they are working to prevent future attacks. They can do this through 
stricter security or through concessions to the terrorists. Even if the politicians chose to 
do nothing, the terrorists could alter the national conversation about their grievances and 
pave the way for concessions down the road.  
 The Polity IV project provides ample reasoning to investigate this issue. Using 
their measures, they have shown that the annual likelihood of an act of political 
instability is most likely to occur in the anocracy range (-5<polity<5).18 While this 
measure does not include terrorism, it is worth examining if this trend applies to terrorism 
as well.   
Finally, while I have methodically gone through much of the literature explaining 
democracy and terrorism, there has been an odd lack of information of the effect of 
terrorism on regimes besides OECD and ‘others.’ This paper hopes to spur further 
literature on the subject. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Nemeth, pg 6 
17
 Pape, pp 3-7 
18
 Monty G. Marhall and Keith Jaggers. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009,” April 2009. 
<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> 
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DATA 
The majority of the economic data comes from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and the Africa Development Index (WDI). The WDI 
contains national data from 213 countries beginning in 1960.19 These indicators cover a 
wide range of topics, from health care to the environment to the economies of each of 
these countries. The majority of the data used in this paper originated from this 
publication. 
The WDI provided the measure I used for the net inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). FDI is an important measure as it can be used as a bellwether for the 
level of risk associated with doing business in the country. Foreign investors have great 
flexibility in choosing where they want to do business. If two countries are relatively 
comparable in costs, but there is a higher probability of an attack in one (thus increasing 
the expected cost there), firms will shift to the more stable country. 
I also looked at a country’s gross capital formation rate, calculated annually. A 
country’s gross capital formation attempts to identify the value of fixed, immovable 
investments which are created in a year. Again, these types of investments are a type of 
proxy for the market risk for long run stability. If a firm believes that any conflicts were 
about to occur in a region, they would not likely invest significant sums of money into 
fixed capital.  
 The total population used in this data set represents the total number of permanent 
residents in a country. The WDI includes all residents regardless of legal status or 
                                                 
19
 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators 
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citizenship – except for refugees and asylum-seekers, who are still considered residents 
of their country of origin. The total population measure is useful for it allows us to make 
per capita calculations and hopefully discover more significant results. 
The 1990s were a period of great commodity price inflation. Since most 
economies in sub-Saharan Africa are not highly industrialized, they often rely on 
exporting primary commodities to other countries where value is added. Since reliance on 
primary goods leads to a significantly higher probability of suffering the resource curse 
or the ‘Dutch Disease,’ economic conditions that ought to be controlled for, I decided to 
use the WDI’s data on primary commodities exports as a percentage of GDP.  
The extent to which a country has an open economy could be a significant factor 
in determining how much a terrorist attack affects an economy. I took a country’s net 
trade, measured as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. The higher 
this percentage is, the more vulnerable an economy is to outside influences. In highly 
volatile world markets, or in markets skittish about investing in risky locations, investors 
might be quick to exit the market. As mentioned in the literature review, terrorist attacks 
tend to create costly barriers to trade as governments try to increase border security. With 
these reasons in mind, I decided to investigate whether the trade percentage rate would 
affect how much a terrorist attack affects the economy. 
By the beginning of the twenty first century, the rate of urbanization in sub-
Saharan Africa was higher than any other region in the world.20 Some cities have even 
experienced growth rates between 11 and 15 % per year. While urbanization under 
                                                 
20
 Thomas D. Sisk, “City Level Democracy in the 21st Century,” International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2002, pp1-3.  
<www.idea.int/publications/dll_africa/upload/Essay.pdf> 
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normal circumstances leads to greater economic specialization and is good for the 
economy in the long run, such extreme urbanization rates can significantly strain the 
ability of a government to maintain control and provide sufficient social services. Bearing 
these problems in mind, I decided to include WDI’s urbanization rates. 
 For the real GDP, I found a United States Department of Agriculture data set which 
provides this data for 190 countries starting in 1969, computed with statistics from the 
WDI and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial statistics.21 Overall, it 
is a strong data set, however, when it does not have adequate information for a given 
country and year, it proceeds to interpolate that information. Such straight-line 
interpolation hinders our efforts to examine the macroeconomic effects of terrorism, so I 
decided to drop this information. This has the unfortunate consequence of reducing the 
total number of observations for what are often countries within the middle to lower 
democracy levels. 
 In order to examine the level of democracy in a country I used the Polity IV index 
as compiled in the ADI. Polity IV’s Institutionalized Democracy Index (IDI) is of 
particular importance to us. The IDI is an additive, weighted scale ranging from 0-10 and 
attempts to display the quality of democratic institutions based upon this definition 
(Marshall, Gurr, and Harff): 
A mature and internally coherent democracy, for example, 
might be operationally defined as one in which (a) political 
participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive; 
(b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on 
                                                 
21
 United States department of Agriculture, “International Macroeconomic Data Set,” 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/ 
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the chief executive are substantial.22 
 
The weighted variables used to create a working index out of this index are: 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraint 
on Chief Executive, and electoral competitiveness.23 Using these variables as a basis, the 
IDI is able to discern between different types of regimes, even showing variation amongst 
those countries generally considered Western liberal democracies. The Polity IV 
codebook uses the example of France to say that the nation under Charles De Gaulle had 
a lower democracy score than later once he was out of office.24 
 The IDI is often used in conjunction with Polity IV’s Institutionalized Autocracy 
Index (IAI). The IAI is similar to the IDI in its structure, as they are both additive, 
weighted indices whose range of scores run from 0-10. The IAI defines autocracy 
operationally as:   
 
In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress 
competitive political participation. Their chief executives 
are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the 
political elite, and once in office they exercise power with 
few institutional constraints. 25 
 
To create an index out of this definition, the IAI looks at five differently weighted 
variables. These are: competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive 
recruitment, constraints on Chief Executive, regulation of participation, and 
                                                 
22
 Monty G. Marhall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. “Polity IV Project: Political 
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009,” April 2009. pp 17-20. 
<www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf > 
23
 Idem., pp. 19-20. 
24
 Idem., pg. 20 
25
 Idem., pp 19-21 
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competitiveness of participation. 
 Many studies and organization use a combination of the IAI and the IDI known as 
the Combined Polity Index, which is included in the WDI. To compute this index, one 
subtracts the IAI from the IDI, meaning that the new variable is on a scale ranging from -
10 to 10. According to Polity IV, the far left end of the spectrum, -10, can be considered a 
hereditary monarchy, whereas the far right end is a consolidated democracy.26 There are 
also three ranges of democracies, which I discussed in the Democracy section of the 
literature review. Polity defines an autocracy as having a combined polity score of -6 or 
less, an anocracy has a score between -5 and +5, and a democracy has a score equal to or 
greater than +6. 
 Although this Combined Polity index is easily found through the World Bank, I 
decided against using this data set and instead opted to only use the IDI. The reason for 
doing so is explained by the Polity codebook, which notes ‘that the middle of the implied 
POLITY ‘spectrum’ is somewhat muddled in terms of the original theory, masking 
various combinations of DEMOC and AUTOC scores with the same POLITY score.’27 
Since the combined polity score does not reflect exactly what I am looking for, I decided 
to concentrate on the IDI. In a similar fashion, I grouped the variables into three groups. 
Autocracies would be in the 0-3 range, anocracies would be either 4, 5, or 6, and 
democracies would be from 7-10. For this paper, I created a variable called RegimeType, 
in which 1 is autocracy, 2 is anocracy, 3 is democracy, and 4 means that there was no 
information. 
                                                 
26
 Idem., pp 20-22 
27
 Idem., pp 19-21. 
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 For my terrorism data, I used the open source Global Terrorism Database, which 
includes information on over 87,000 terrorist attacks since 1970. For an act to be included 
in the database, it must have these three attributes: 
1. The incident must be intentional 
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence 
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors 
 
Furthermore, the event must satisfy at least two of the following three criteria to be 
included. 
1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social 
goal. 
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some 
other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. 
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.28 
 
This definition falls in line with the definition I discussed earlier in the literature review.  
 It can be difficult to determine whether coordinated terrorist attacks should be 
considered parts of a larger attack or individual attacks altogether. For example, should 
the planes that attacked the Pentagon on September 11th be considered part of the same 
attack, which included the planes that hit the World Trade Centers? According to the 
Global Terrorism Database, the answer is no. If either the location or times of occurrence 
of the attacks are discontinuous, then they will be regarded as individual attacks.29  
 There are several limitations to the data. The process by which the data is gathered 
is one such limitation. The data set is collected from news sources, both official and 
unofficial. Official statistics may try to downplay the extent of the damage caused by the 
                                                 
28
 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Global 
Terrorism Database,” May 2010, pp-4-5. 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf 
29
 Idem., pp 6-7 
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attack, whereas the media may speculate too much or have inaccurate statistics. Some 
attacks may also be misattributed to a certain group, perhaps on purpose or maybe just on 
accident. Another limitation is that the quality, accuracy, and volume of information all 
vary greatly by country.30 The known information can be very ambiguous, and some 
countries (and their respective independent media) may not have the resources to commit 
to a full investigation.   
 For this paper, I generated another two variables from the data set. First, I added the 
number of people killed and added it to the number of people wounded to generate a 
variable representing the total number of casualties. Secondly, I generated a list of the 
number of terrorist attacks per year for each country. These numbers hope to capture both 
the magnitude and the rate of attacks over this period. 
 In order to fully investigate the economic consequences of terrorism, I must control 
for internal conflicts. To do so, I turned to the Political Instability Task Force’s (PITF) 
PITF-State Failure Problem Set which contains data for 307 events between 1955 and 
2009. The events are separated into four separate categories: ethnic wars, revolutionary 
wars, adverse regime changes, and genocide or politicide.31  
The PITF defines a revolutionary war as an ‘episode of violent conflict between 
governments and politically organized groups (political challengers) that seek to 
overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one 
                                                 
30
 National Counterterrorism Center, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2005,” Statistical 
Annex. April 7, 2006, 4. < www.state.gov/documents/organization/65489.pdf> 
31
 Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Barbara Harff. PITF-State Failure Problem 
Set. Dataset and Coding Guidelines. May 7 2010. pp 1-5. 
<www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITFProbSetCodebook2009.pdf> 
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region.”32 It is operationally defined as a having at least 100 armed agents, demonstrators, 
troops, etc. and having at least 1000 direct conflict-related deaths over the full course of 
the conflict and having at least one year in which more than 100 were killed.  
Ethnic wars arise between governments and ethnic communities which attempt to 
challenge their status in society. Similar to revolutionary wars, there must be more than 
1000 people mobilized to cross the mobilization threshold and more than 1000 direct 
conflict-related deaths must be accounted for over the time period for the conflict to be 
designated as an ethnic war.33 
Adverse regime changes involve a significant, adverse shift in governance. Using the 
combined POLITY index, there must be at least a six-point drop on the scale.34 This 
could be the result of a coup, an armed conflict, or even by popular referendum. By 
relying upon the Polity scale, this variable encounters many of the same problems. 
The PITF defines genocides and politicides as events which ‘involve the promotion, 
execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents 
that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of either communal group.’35 Their 
operational definition has three different criteria which must be satisfied: complicity in 
mass murder must be well established, the period must last at least six months, and their 
victims are non-combatants. The total number of people killed does not play a role in 
determining an event’s status of genocide, as the victimized group may not have started 
off very large. 
                                                 
32
 Idem., 4 
33
 Idem., 5 
34
 Idem., 10-14 
35
 Idem., 14-16 
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This data set is very comprehensive, but there can be problems in compiling them 
together. For example, some of the conflicts may be considered both an ethnic war and a 
genocide. If I were to simply combine everything, I would run the risk of double counting 
certain events. Therefore, to prevent this from happening when I was compiling this into 
one data set, ‘Internal Conflict,’ I simply used a dummy variable to show that there 
existed an internal conflict in that country during that year. While this prevents double 
counting, I cannot adequately investigate how the magnitude of the internal conflict 
affects our model. 
 Just as it was important to control for internal conflict, I must also control for 
external ones. To do so, I turned to the International Crisis Behavior Project dataset. This 
dataset defines an external conflict as a ‘specific act, event or situational change which 
leads decision-makers to perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for response and 
heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities.’36 While their dataset 
consists of a variety of different types of external conflicts, I only include those which 
have an element of violence. Then, similar to the internal conflict data, I created a 
dummy variable to determine whether a country had an external conflict during a given 
year. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Johnathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, “Codebook for ICB2 – International Crisi 
Behavior Project.” July 2010, pp13-15. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/ICB2-2010-
final.pdf 
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RESULTS 
BASIC STATISTICS 
Table 1 contains basic statistics for all sub-Saharan African countries for the years 
between 1970 and 2009.  When I look at dy, the variable for logged real GDP growth, 
some statistics jump out at us. First of all, sixteen countries averaged negative growth 
rates. While the average for the nation is positive, much of the continent has yet to fully 
realize its potential.  
Sub-Saharan African countries averaged approximately 3.21 terrorist attacks a 
year. However, this figure is beset by many outliers and irregularities in the data. For 
example, simply controlling for South Africa (ZAF) reduces the average number of 
terrorist attacks to 2.04. Similarly, this measure neither shows the distribution of attacks 
over the years nor shows if they were clustered together. Nonetheless, it is helpful to start 
here to see which countries have been hit the most over these years. 
Investment, which is the log of gross capital expenditures, seems to be relatively 
well distributed. Perhaps surprisingly, Equatorial Guinea has the highest level (3.52), 
whereas the Central Africa Republic has the lowest (2.40). There exists a strong 
correlation between investment and trade as a percentage of GDP, which is defined as the 
sum of net imports and exports divided by the total GDP. To prevent collinearity from 
throwing off the results, I have proceeded to only use trade as a percentage of GDP in 
future statistics. 
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REGRESSION ON TERRORISM INCIDENTS 
 Table 2 is a panel regression looking at different variables to determine if they 
influence the rate of terrorism. The first regressions include dy and the existence of 
external conflict during the year (E), but continue to include a country’s urbanization rate 
(Urb), institutionalized democracy index level (Dem), commodity exports as a percentage 
of GDP (ComExp), the log of international trade as a percentage of GDP (Open), and 
number of internal conflicts per year (IC). 
Without any discrimination amongst the countries, I see that only Dem remains 
significant as variables are included. As the country becomes more democratic it tends to 
experience more terrorism. This is what I expected to find, as most literature has found 
similar results. Internal conflicts also tend to increase the number of terrorist attacks, 
which also makes sense. However, the robust standard error for IC is rather large, 
diminishing its effect in helping us investigate the causes of terrorism. Furthermore, even 
after all of the variables are taken into account, only approximately 24% of the variation 
is explained. 
Having looked at all the countries together, I split the countries into autocracies, 
anocracies, and democracies and proceeded to run the same panel regressions. When a 
country is an autocracy (Regime 1), little information can be extracted. However, internal 
conflict continues to have a significant impact, and its standard error is smaller, which is 
the silver lining to these regressions.  
Little more information is available for anocracies. Again, income has no 
significant impact on the incidence of terrorism. However, the existence of an external 
conflict in a given year significantly decreases the number of attacks. We must take this 
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revelation with a grain of salt, as there are not enough observations to continue 
investigating its significance, but it remains something which ought to be considered in 
the future.  
Democracies here have the most significant – and interesting – findings. While 
democracies have a higher average rate of democracy, once they are in the ‘democracy’ 
range, they begin to endure fewer terrorist events as Dem increases. While this seems to 
fly in the face of most of the literature, we must consider another fact. Perhaps once a 
government passes a certain threshold, a democracy begins to have fewer attacks. This 
begs the question if I should further subdivide democracies and run panel regressions to 
investigate their effects, but this will not be answered in this paper. There is also the 
significant chance that I do not have enough observations, that there have too few 
democracies for enough years to truly say for sure. 
 
 
REGRESSIONS ON GDP GROWTH 
 
 I have decided to run panel regressions in the very same manner to determine the 
macroeconomic consequences of terrorism. 
The panel regression with all of the countries contains many significant variables, 
the most important one being T, the number of terrorist attacks in a year. Throughout the 
entire panel, the number of terrorist attacks remains significant and negative at the 5% 
level. Later, the number of casualties becomes significant at the same level – leadings us 
to believe that there indeed is a strong correlation between the economy and both the 
number of and the magnitude of the attacks.  
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Several other variables start off significant but lose this status as more variables 
are added. The most interesting case of this involves the institutionalized democracy 
index. At one point, Dem was significant at the 1% level, but began to drop off once I 
included commodities as a percentage of GDP (ComExp) and is no longer significant 
once openness is included.  
Luckily I get better panel regression results when looking at the variables causing 
growth. In the first case, autocracy, I see that neither the magnitude (cas) nor the rate (T) 
of terrorist attacks become significant until I include several variables. However, the 
results are mixed. T follows the traditional model, and each attack has a significant and 
adverse (albeit small) effect on dy, but the number of casualties actually correlates to a 
positive increase in dy. However, these effects only become significant once the number 
of observations drops from 1145 to 407 after I include the ComExp variable, leading me 
to believe that this is the result of outliers in a smaller sample. 
While it does not extend throughout all of the regressions, terrorism does seem to 
have a significant impact on dy. However, I did not expect the results to be positive 
throughout the entire panel.  This may be a result of only using 179 (or, later, only 88) 
observations. On the other hand, I have at least one regression which shows that the 
magnitude of terrorism indeed has a very significant (at the 1% level) and negative effect.  
The last panel regression looks at the channels which affect real GDP per capita 
growth. Until the last few variables are added, terrorism has a significant but negative 
effect, yet this result changes once I add the variable ComExp. The results are not perfect, 
but it is not a bad assumption to say that terrorism affects dy, but only by a small 
magnitude. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I started this paper to determine whether it was foolish to limit democracy to a 
binary variable when studying the effects of terrorism. Having run several regressions, I 
can finally arrive at several conclusions. 
Just as the literature said, I found that democracies do indeed suffer from higher 
levels of terrorist attacks, but the relationship between democracy and terrorist incidents 
does not seem to be completely linear or continuous. My data show that democracies 
have a higher mean of attacks, yet my regressions say up to the 1% confidence level that, 
once a nation becomes a democracy, further democratization actually brings about a 
desirable solution to terrorism. 
The strength of the correlation between regime type and number of terrorist 
attacks breaks down pretty quickly once I move on to anocracies and autocracies. While 
the data shows that the relationship between anocracy and terrorism is at least somewhat 
significant and negative, the evidence is not strong enough to warrant any significant 
conclusions.  
I can reach similar conclusion concerning the economic effects of terrorism. I see 
that both the quantity and magnitude of terrorist attacks affect growth through different 
yet significant channels. Why the regressions have shown that casualties actually 
correlate to a small increase in growth is something which the model does not explain, 
yet is worth exploring in future papers. 
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When I looked at the same effects on a regime basis, I came across results which 
were both expected and unexpected. I both expected and found terrorism to have a 
statistically significant and negative relation to growth in democracies, but I did not think 
that anocracies would have statistically significant and positive results. For this reason, I 
suspect that my hypothesis that terrorism has different effects on different types of 
regimes is correct, but the assumption of the channels through which this occurs requires 
further studies. 
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TABLES 
 
 
Country List 
 
 
 
Country 
Code Country 
AGO Angola 
BDI Burundi 
BEN Benin 
BFA Burkina Faso 
BWA Botswana 
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 
CMR Cameroon 
COG Congo, Republic of 
COM Comoros 
CPV Cape Verde 
DJI Djibouti 
ERI Eritrea 
ETH Ethiopia 
GAB Gabon 
GHA Ghana 
GIN Guinea 
GMB Gambia, The 
GNB Guinea-Bissau 
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 
KEN Kenya 
LBR Liberia 
LSO Lesotho 
MDG Madagascar 
MLI Mali 
MOZ Mozambique 
MRT Mauritania 
MUS Mauritius 
MWI Malawi 
NAM Namibia 
NER Niger 
NGA Nigeria 
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RWA Rwanda 
SDN Sudan 
SEN Senegal 
SLE Sierra Leone 
SOM Somalia 
STP Sao Tome and Principe 
SWZ Swaziland 
SYC Seychelles 
TCD Chad 
TGO Togo 
TZA Tanzania 
UGA Uganda 
ZAF South Africa 
ZAR Congo, DR 
ZMB Zambia 
ZWE Zimbabwe 
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Basic Country Statistics 
 
 
Country dy T Investment Trade (%GDP) 
AGO 0.02 11.98 2.65 112.32 
BDI 0.00 8.70 2.29 33.16 
BEN 0.01 0.23 2.79 45.86 
BFA 0.01 0.08 2.94 35.16 
BWA 0.05 0.20 3.45 100.29 
CIV -0.01 1.00 2.65 73.51 
CMR 0.01 0.53 2.95 45.96 
COG 0.01 0.63 3.29 113.77 
COM -0.01 0.13 2.88 55.90 
CPV 0.04 0.18 3.37 74.08 
DJI -0.02 0.48 2.54 99.65 
ERI 0.00 0.00 3.11 84.88 
ETH 0.01 3.28 2.88 28.28 
GAB 0.01 0.10 3.44 96.65 
GHA 0.00 0.43 2.63 57.04 
GIN 0.01 0.30 2.93 56.58 
GMB 0.01 0.08 2.86 100.66 
GNB 0.00 0.18 3.15 54.86 
GNQ 0.04 0.03 3.52 126.39 
KEN 0.01 3.48 3.01 59.55 
LBR -0.04 0.00 2.47 108.82 
LSO 0.03 0.60 3.50 134.86 
MDG -0.02 0.50 2.55 47.00 
MLI 0.01 1.13 2.94 51.76 
MOZ 0.02 5.58 2.82 51.82 
MRT 0.01 0.25 3.12 101.28 
MUS 0.04 0.00 3.24 118.36 
MWI 0.01 0.10 3.02 61.83 
NAM 0.00 3.55 3.00 108.40 
NER -0.01 1.30 2.52 43.89 
NGA 0.01 7.35   57.39 
RWA 0.01 3.30 2.71 32.75 
SDN 0.02 4.50 2.74 27.89 
SEN 0.00 2.23 2.80 64.45 
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SLE 0.00 2.20 2.28 48.09 
SOM   13.43 3.13 56.89 
STP 0.00 0.00     
SWZ 0.01 0.38 3.04 153.70 
SYC 0.02 0.05 3.30 152.43 
TCD 0.00 1.10 2.61 55.59 
TGO -0.01 1.20 2.97 88.89 
TZA 0.01 0.25 2.96 49.24 
UGA 0.01 7.88 2.51 32.58 
ZAF 0.00 59.27 3.03 52.01 
ZAR -0.03 3.06 2.24 44.40 
ZMB -0.01 1.50 2.97 74.35 
ZWE -0.01 4.23 2.83 57.32 
Total 0.01 3.34 2.90 72.40 
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PANEL REGRESSIONS 
 
Panel 1: 
Regressions on T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. All specifications include time and 
individual fixed eects. Models (1) through (5) are dierent specifications of panel T regressions. 
Models (1) through (5) are the basic OLS model adding separately other variables such as the 
urbanization rate (Urb), the institutionalized democracy level (Dem), external wars (W), 
commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (ComExp), and net trade as a percentage of GDP 
(Open). Included in each regression is the lag of GDP per capita (dy) and dummy variable for the 
presence of external conflicts (E). R-squared is calculated without fixed eects. 
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Panel 2: 
Regime 1: Regressions on T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. Models (1) through (5) are dierent 
specifications of panel T regressions. Models (1) through (5) are the basic OLS model adding 
separately other variables such as the urbanization rate (Urb), the institutionalized democracy 
level (Dem), external wars (W), commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (ComExp), and net 
trade as a percentage of GDP (Open). Included in each regression is the lag of GDP per capita 
(dy) and dummy variable for the presence of external conflicts (E). R-squared is calculated 
without fixed eects. 
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Panel 3: 
Regime 2: Regressions on T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. Models (1) through (5) are dierent 
specifications of panel T regressions. Models (1) through (5) are the basic OLS model adding 
separately other variables such as the urbanization rate (Urb), the institutionalized democracy 
level (Dem), external wars (W), commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (ComExp), and net 
trade as a percentage of GDP (Open). Included in each regression is the lag of GDP per capita 
(dy) and dummy variable for the presence of external conflicts (E). R-squared is calculated 
without fixed eects. 
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Panel 4: 
 
Regime 3: Regressions on T 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. Models (1) through (5) are dierent 
specifications of panel T regressions. Models (1) through (5) are the basic OLS model adding 
separately other variables such as the urbanization rate (Urb), the institutionalized democracy 
level (Dem), external wars (W), commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (ComExp), and net 
trade as a percentage of GDP (Open). Included in each regression is the lag of GDP per capita 
(dy) and dummy variable for the presence of external conflicts (E). R-squared is calculated 
without fixed eects. 
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Notes: For the remaining tables, robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 
.10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. Models (1) through (7) are dierent specifications of panel growth regressions. Models (1) through (7) are 
the basic OLS model adding separately other variables such as the urbanization rate (Urb), the institutionalized democracy level (Dem), the 
dummy variable for the presence of an external conflict (E), commodity exports as a percentage of GDP (ComExp), the number of casualties 
as a result of terrorist attacks (cas), internal conflict (IC) and net trade as a percentage of GDP (Open). Included in each regression is the lag of 
GDP per capita (lnylag) and the number of terrorist attacks (T). R-squared is calculated without fixed effects.
 37 
 
 38 
 
 39 
 
 
 40 
 
 41 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Abadie, Alberto and Javier Gardeazabal, “Terrorism and the World Economy,” University 
of the Basque Country. August 2007, pp 2. <http://www.dfaeii.ehu.es/s0044-
con/en/contenidos/informacion/00044_documentos/en_00044_dc/adjuntos/wp200
5-19.pdf> (accessed April 19, 2011)  
 
Barth, James R., Tong Li, Don McCarthy, Triphon Phumiwasana, and Glenn Yago, 
“Economic Impacts of Global Terrorism: From Munich to Bali,” Milken Institute. 
October 2006, pp 13-16. 
<http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/econ_impact_terrorism.pdf>  (accessed April 
4, 2011)  
 
Blomberg, Brock, Gregory Hess, Athanasios Orphanides, “The Macroeconomic 
Consequences of Terrorism.” Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 51 Issue 5 
2004. 10- 12 <http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v51y2004i5p1007-1032.html> 
(accessed January 24, 2011) 
 
Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler, “Transnational Terrorism 1968-2000: Thresholds, 
Persistence, and Forecasts,” Southern Economic Journal. Vol. 71, No.3. 2003. pp 
467-482. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20062054> (accessed March 27, 2011) 
 
Freedom House, “Methodology,” 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005> (accessed 
March 17, 2011)    
 
Freedom House, “Map of Freedom in the World 2010,” 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010> (accessed 
March 17, 2011) 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp3. 
 
Kekic, Laza. “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy.” The Economist 
Intelligence Unit. pp. 1-2 
<http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf> 
(accessed February 21, 2011)  
 
Legal Information Institute. “United States Code: Title 18,2331.” Cornell Law. June 29 
2010. <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002331----000-
.html> (accessed March 20, 2011) 
  
 
 42 
Marshall, Monty G, Ted Robert Gurr, and Barbara Harff, “PITF-State Failure Problem 
Set. Dataset and Coding Guidelines,” May 7 2010. pp 1-10, 14-16. 
<www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITFProbSetCodebook2009.pdf> (accessed 
February 21, 2010) 
 
Marhall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. “Polity IV Project: Political 
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009,” April 2009. pp 17-22. 
<www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf> (accessed February 21, 
2011) 
 
Munck, Gerardo L. and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizaing and Measuring Democracy: 
Evaluating Alternative Indices,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 35 No.1, 2002. 
pp. 4-6<http://cps.sagepub.com/content/35/1/5/> (accessed April 4, 2011) 
 
National Counterterrorism Center. Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, Statistical Annex. 
April 7, 2006, 4. < www.state.gov/documents/organization/65489.pdf> (accessed 
March 24, 2011) 
 
Nemeth, Stephen. “Adaptive Tactics: Terrorist Targeting and Regime Type.” 2006. 
University of Iowa. pp 6, 9-14 
<http://myweb.uiowa.edu/snemeth/MPSA%20Terrorism%20Paper.pdf> (accessed 
April 6, 2011) 
 
Pape, Robert A. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” American Political Science 
Review Vol. 97, No3. August 2003, pp  2-7. 
<http://www.danieldrezner.com/research/guest/Pape1.pdf> (accessed April 3, 
2011) 
 
“Polity and the Onset of Political Instability Events, 1995-2006.” Center for Systemic 
Peace. 2008. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/PTfig03.htm> (accessed 
February 21, 2011) 
 
Sisk, Thomas D. “City Level Democracy in the 21st Century,” International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2002, pp 1-3. 
<www.idea.int/publications/dll_africa/upload/Essay.pdf> (accessed April 3, 2011) 
 
Vanhanen, Tatu “Introduction: Measures of Democratization,” Center for the Study of 
Civil Wars, March 2000, pp 6-9 
<http://www.prio.no/misc/Download.aspx?file=%2fprojects%2fdataset-website-
workspace%2fPolyarchy%2520Dataset%2520Manuscript%2ffile42501_introducti
on.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2011)  
 
Wilkenfeld, Johnathan and Michael Brecher, “Codebook for ICB2 – International Crisi 
Behavior Project.” July 2010, pp13-15. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/ICB2-
2010-final.pdf (accessed April 12, 2011).  
